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WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION:
AN ANALYSIS OF NEBRASKA'S REVISED
"ACCIDENT" REQUIREMENT
John M. Gradwohl*
I.
THE BACKGROUND
The Nebraska workmen's compensation statute, if applicable
to the parties, covers "every case of injury or death caused by ac-
cident or occupational disease arising out of and in the course of
employment."' From adoption of the statute in 1913, the term "ac-
cident" was defined to "mean an unexpected or unforeseen event
happening suddenly and violently, with or without human fault, and
producing at the time objective symptoms of an injury."2
For the first twenty years under this statute, the Nebraska
Supreme Court, in line with the precedents under the English
Workmen's Compensation Act of 1897 from which the "accident"
requirement was derived, held that an unexpected internal injury
was compensable whether or not the injury was caused by an
external event.3 Since 1941, the Court consistently construed the
phrase "unexpected or unforeseen event" to require an event ex-
ternal to the body, some sort of a slip, trip or fall, or exertion
more strenuous than that ordinarily incident to the employment.4
* B.S., 1951, LL.B., 1953, University of Nebraska; LL.M., 1957, Harvard
Law School; Member, Nebraska Bar; Professor of Law, University of
Nebraska.
'NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-109 (Reissue 1960) ("except accidents caused by,
or resulting in any degree from the employee's willful negligence as
defined in section 48-151").
2 Neb. Laws c. 198, § 52(b), p. 601 (1913), NEB. REv. STAT. § 48-151(2)
(Reissue 1960).
See cases collected in Gradwohl, Nebraska Workmen's Compensationfor Aggravation of Pre-Existing Infirmities By Exertion or Strain, 41
NE-. L. REV. 101, 112-16 (1961).
41d. at 123-28; Pruitt v. McMaken Transp. Co., 175 Neb. 477, 122 N.W.2d
236 (1963); Green v. Benson Transfer Co., 173 Neb. 226, 113 N.W.2d 61(1962); Chism v. Convair Mobile Homes, Inc., 173 Neb. 86, 112 N.W.2d
393 (1961). See Cochran v. Bellevue Bridge Co., 174 Neb. 761, 119
N.W.2d 292 (1963). See also Seymour v. Journal-Star Printing Co., 174
Neb. 150, 116 N.W.2d 297 (1962). Between 1934 and 1941, the Court,
without specifically dealing with the issue in a written opinion, per-
mitted the rulings of the past cases to evaporate and developed the
ordinary exertion rules. See note 3 supra, at 116-23. Two opinions treated
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As a result, some employees injured from work-connected strain
or exertion in performing their ordinary duties were not entitled
to workmen's compensation.
II.
A SUMMARY OF L.B. 497
The effect of the 1963 amendments can be briefly, but fully,
summarized in one sentence: The only substantive change made
in previous Nebraska workmen's compensation law was to eliminate
the judicial interpretatioiz that an "unexpected or uoforeseen event"
meant only an "external" event.
The statute now clearly, provides that an unexpected or unfore-
seen "injury" is compensable. In other words, where Nebraska
formerly awarded compensation only if there was an unexpected
or unforeseen "cause" of injury, compensation will now be _paid
where there is an unexpected or unforeseen injury, regardless of
whether the "cause" of injury, is unexpected or unforeseen."
This has had the effect of completely overruling, legislatively,
a few Nebraska cases and portions of many more decisions -While
there were no other changes in the substantive provisions of' the
Nebraska accident definition, the 1963 amendments will certainly
serve to focus additional attention on the previous requirements
pertaining to "happening suddenly and violently," "producing .at
the time objective symptoms of an injury," and the burden of factual
proof. ...
The other material added by the 1963 bill merely codifies rules
which had become well settled and consistently applied through
numerous judicial decisions. The accident definition now. contains
some of the burden of factual proof rules which rested previously
wholly on judicial decision.- The definition of "injury" has 'been
amended to include one aspect of the 'judicially developed'"rules
concerning aggravation of a pre-existing infirmity. No substantive
or procedural changes were made or intended by these amendments.
the amount of "unusual exertion" present as an "unexpected or unfore-
seen event," but, factually, these' cases riiay'also have involved another
external event. Knaggs v. City of Lexington, 171 Neb.-, 135, 105 N.W.2d
727 (1960); Anderson v. Cowger, 158 'Neb. 772, 65 N.W.2d 51" (1954).
Of special difficulty was' a determination of the point adt which a
"wobble, lurch or jerk," or some similar term, constituted an external
event. Compare Gilbert v. Metropolitan Util. Dist., 156 Neb. 750, 57
N.W.2d 770 (1953), with Carranza v. Payne-Lars6n Furniture Co., 165
Neb. 352,.85 N.W.2d 694' (1957), Green 'v. Behson Transfer Co., supra,
and Pruitt v. McMaken-Transp: Co.,-supra. - ....- 
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As amended, the statute provides: 5
The word accident as used in this act shall, unless a different
meaning is clearly indicated by the context, be construed to mean
an unexpected or unforeseen [event] injury happening suddenly
and violently, with or without human fault, and producing at the
time objective symptoms of an injury. The claimant shall have a
burden of proof to establish by a preponderance of the evidence
that such unexpected or unforeseen injury was in fact caused by
the employment. There shall be no presumption from the mere
occurrence of such unexpected or unforeseen injury that the injury
was in fact caused by the employment.
The terms injury and personal injuries shall mean only violence
to the physical structure of the body and such disease or infection
as naturally results therefrom. The terms shall include disablement
resulting from occupational disease arising out of and in the course
of the employment in which the employee was engaged and which
was contracted in said employment.6 The terms shall include an
aggravation of a preexisting occupational disease, the employer
being liable only for the degree of aggravation of the preexisting
occupational disease. The terms shall not be construed to include
disability or death due to natural causes but occurring while the
employee is at work, nor to mean an injury, disability or death
- that is the result of a natural progression of any preexisting con-
dition.
"UNEXPECTED OR UNFORESEEN INJURY"
The dominant legislative intent behind enactment of L.B. 497
was to restore the original interpretation' of the "accident" defini-
5 NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 48-151(2) and (4), as amended by L.B. 497, 73d Neb.
Leg. Sess. (1963), indicating new and [deleted] language. Neb. Laws c.
.287, pp. 862-63, § 1(2) (4) (1963).
The effect of L.B. 497 on Nebraska workmen's compensation insur-
ance rates cannot yet be accurately determined. However, based upon
past experience, compensation insurance rates were decreased by 7.9%
in October, 1963, after taking into consideration the 1963 legislative
changes other than L.B. 497. Without the 1963 legislation, the rates
would have been decreased 11.1%. Thus, the effect of the 1963 Nebraska
rate increases and other changes, except LB. 497, was 3.2% based upon
previous experience figures. It seems very unlikely that the effect of
L.B. 497 (as distinguished from other factors which could cause an in-
crease in workmen's compensation rates) would raise the workmen's
compensation rates back up to those in effect during the 1963 legislative
session.
6 The phrase "and the disability commenced within two years subsequent
to the date of termination of the employment" was deleted by L.B. 41,
73d Neb. Leg. Sess. (1963)....
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tion.7 These early Nebraska cases allowed compensation for in-
juries from exertion or strain without regard to the severity of the
exertion, if attributable to the employment. This was true whether
or not the exertion was a part of the performance of the regular
duties of the employee.
The opinion most representative of present Nebraska law
would appear to be the 1917 decision in Manning v. Pomerene.8 A
63-year-old steam fitter's helper injured blood vessels in his brain
or stomach while pushing his body against two steel "I" beams
which protruded about three feet over the floor of a passageway.
The exertion involved a "natural and expected" part of the em-
ployee's duties.9 There were "objective symptoms of an injury"
at that time. The condition worsened for three days, when there
was vomiting of blood. From the Court's opinion, it appears that
"afterwards he had hiccoughs that lasted for about two weeks, and
was very weak, and soon afterwards had a slight paralytic stroke
that affected one arm and leg."'10
The Court affirmed a lifetime award for total-permanent dis-
ability. The opinion concluded that the claimant had sustained
his burden of proof that there had in fact been an accident, and
that the disability from which he suffered was a result of the acci-
dent rather than of a progressive arterio sclerosis. The "unforeseen
or unexpected event" in the statutory definition of "accident" was
the work-caused strain in attempting to push the steel beams.
"The unforeseen event was the straining, weakening or lesion of the
blood vessels of the brain or stomach, and this was an unforseen
[sic] event happening suddenly.""
7 Statement of Judiciary Committee on L.B. 497, 73d Neb. Leg. Sess., May
22, 1963: "For the last two decades the Supreme Court has given a
narrow interpretation of the type of injury which occurs from exertion
on the part of the employee while doing work demanded by his employ-
ment. At one time the Nebraska court favored the more liberal rule
which is law in a great majority of the other states; but in the last two
decades our Supreme Court has construed, generally, that inner bodily
injuries caused by exertion are not compensable unless the employee
obtains such in connection with a slip, trip or fall. This narrow court
interpretation does not do justice in many cases and is not in harmony
with the majority of opinions in other states under workmen's com-
pensation law."
8 101 Neb. 127, 162 N.W. 492 (1917).
9 Id. at 129, 162 N.W. at 493.
10 Id. at 130, 162 N.W. at 493.
11 Id. at 129, 162 N.W. 493.
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Between 1917 and 1937, there were several other decisions
allowing recovery for heat stroke1 2 and for strain from lifting in
performing the ordinary duties of the employment. 13 The signifi-
cance of these holdings is that the injury was compensable whether
or not it was a consequence of normal employment duties. In fact,
an employee would probably be entitled to compensation even
for a work caused injury from performing duties which were lighter
or easier than those ordinarily required of him or than which the
general public might be expected to perform. All injuries would
appear to be "unexpected or unforeseen" other than "accidents
caused by, or resulting in any degree from the employee's willful
negligence as defined in section 48-151."' 4
Although ordinary exertion or exposure will not normally be
a factor in awarding workmen's compensation, it may still be a
relevant factor in some situations in determining whether the em-
ployment did "in fact" cause the injury or whether the injury was
one "arising out of and in the course of employment." In the
"injury by the elements" cases, the Court has traditionally required
as an element of employment connection that in order to be com-
pensable, the employee must be subjected to a greater risk and
hazard than is the public generally. 5 The same result will be
reached under the 1963 amendment either under the accident
definition language, "in fact caused by the employment," or under
"arising out of and in the course of employment."
In 1962, the Florida court adopted a special exertion rule in
"heart" cases even after a legislative amendment of the accident
definition. Heart cases seem to have been the most difficult cate-
gory of cases to decide factually with respect to employment and
medical causation. To establish employment connection, not the
presence of an accident, Florida judicially applies an unusual
exertion test.1 This rule is employed only in heart cases; it does
12 Young v. Western Furniture & Mfg. Co., 101 Neb. 696, 164 N.W. 712
(1917); Kanscheit v. Garrett Laundry, 101 Neb. 702, 164 N.W. 708 (1917).
13 Dymak v. Haskins Bros., 132 Neb. 308, 271 N.W. 860 (1937); Skelly Oil
Co. v. Gaugenbaugh, 119 Neb. 698, 230 N.W. 688 (1930); Derr v. Kirk-
patrick, 106 Neb. 403, 184 N.W. 91 (1921).
14 NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-109 (Reissue 1960). Other than through the defense
of willful negligence, the doctrine of assumption of risk appears to have
finally been eliminated from the compensation statute.
15 See note 3 supra, at 113-14 n.43.
16 Victor Wine & Liquor, Inc. v. Beasley, 141 So. 2d 581, 587, 588-89 (Fla.
1962). After discussing the legislative revision codifying the previous ju-
dicial and legislative reversal of the slip, trip or fall rules, the opinion on
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not apply to other "internal failure" cases. Other states have also
employed special exertion rules in heart cases as an element of
proof of employment or medical causation. 7
L.B. 497 as originally introduced was copied from the amended
Florida statute. 8 While the Nebraska bill was later amended by
the legislature, it still appears possible that the Nebraska Court
could adopt a similar judicial rule for proof of employment con-
nection in heart cases.
IV.
CASES LEGISLATIVELY OVERRULED
Only a few Nebraska Supreme Court decisions have been legis-
latively .overruled in the sense that the Court would now be com-
pelled to reach an opposite result if the case were tried under the
rehearing states: "It is therefore settled beyond question in this state
that an internal failure, such as a strained muscle, ruptured disc,
'snapped' knee-cap, and the like, brought about by exertion in the
performance of the regular or usual duties of the employment, may
be found to be an injury 'by accident,' without the necessity of showing
that such injury was preceded by some incident, such as a slip, fall or
blow. . . . In the so-called 'exposure' cases, this court has stressed
that, to entitle the employee to compensation, he must have been sub-jected to more than the ordinary hazards confronting people generally;
but we have found no case in which it has been held that the ill effects
of the exposure must occur suddenly and be immediately related to
an identifiable incident .... When disabling heart attacks are involved
and where such heart conditions are precipitated by work-connected
exertion affecting a pre-existing non-disabling heart disease, said in-juries are compensable only if the employee was at the time subject to-
unusual strain or over-exertion not routine to the type of work he wag
accustomed to performing. Thus, if there is competent substantial'
medical testimony, consistent with logic and reason, that the strain and
exertion of a specifically identified effort, over and above the routine
of the job, combined with a pre-existing non-disabling heart disease
to produce death or disability sooner than it would otherwise have
occurred from the normal progression of the disease, the employee has
a right to some compensation." See Friendly Frost Used Appliances v.
Reiser, 152 So. 2d 721 (Fla. 1963) (lifting heavy refrigerators routine
to employment). See also Diamelio v. Royal Castle, 148 So. 2d 8 (Fla.
1962) (epileptic seizure due to substantial heat at work held com-
pensable). Compare City of Boca Raton v. Sellers, 148 So. 2d 25 (Fla.
1962), with Eschenbrenner v. Employers Mut. Cas. Co., 165 Neb. 32,
84 N.W.2d 169 (1957). Perhaps Nebraska police officers are just ex-
pected to be more heroic than Florida police officers.
17See 1 LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAw §§ 38.64, 38.64(a),
38.64(b), 38.73, 38.83 (1952). A number of states have special statutes
for the compensability of hernias. Id. § 39.70.18 FrA. STAT. § 440.02(19) (1961) ("unexpected or unusual event or result").
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
1963 amendment. These cases involve situations in which the Court,
after examining the evidence, has concluded affirmatively that the
employee's injury was in fact caused by his employment, but since
the employment-cause involved only ordinary exertion or strain,
the injury was not compensable.
Two recent decisions illustrate the category of cases which have
been entirely overruled. In Pruitt v. McMaken Transp. Co.,19 the
Court apparently concluded that lifting an 80 to 85 pound box
caused a back injury, but stated that since this exertion was ordi-
narily incident to the employment of a dock-worker, the injury
was not compensable. In Green v. Benson Transfer Co.,2 0 a truck
driver was lifting a 500 to 550 pound hide-a-bed with a fellow
employee when the bed fell open and he sustained a hernia. The
opinion acknowledged that the injury resulted from the employ-
ment, but denied compensation because "the shifting of the weight
was usual and expected, and a common incident of the employ-
ment.",21
Other Nebraska decisions have been partially overruled to the
extent of their utilization of the "ordinary exertion" or "slip, trip
or fall" rules. Where the Court has concluded that the claimant
failed to sustain the burden of proof that his injury was due to the
exertion or strain of his employment,22 the decision has been over-
ruled only to the extent the opinion may have gone on to employ
alternative reasoning that even if shown to have been work-caused,
19 175 Neb. 477, 482, 122 N.W.2d 236, 240 (1963): "This appears to be a
case where the exertion incident to his occupation resulted in the back
difficulty. We are committed to the rule of law in this jurisdiction that
mere exertion which is no greater than that ordinarily incident to the
employment cannot of itself constitute an accident."
20173 Neb. 226, 113 N.W.2d 61 (1962).
211d. at 228, 113 N.W.2d at 62: "Under the evidence adduced, plaintiff's
injury resulted from work incident to his employment. It falls within
the rule announced in Jones v. Yankee Hill Brick Manufacturing Co.,
161 Neb. 404, 73 N.W.2d 394, which is to the effect that mere exertion,
which is no greater than that ordinarily incident to the employment,
cannot of itself constitute an accident within the meaning of the work-
men's compensation law. In the instant case the incident claimed to be
an accident was not only common to the employment but it was recog-
nized as such when means were taken by use of a strap to limit the
shifting of the weight in carrying the hide-a-bed."
22 E.g., Roccaforte v. State Furniture Co., 142 Neb. 768, 771, 7 N.W.2d 656,
659 (1943): ' There is no evidence to show that the exertion or pressure
was such as would be connected in any manner with the disease which
he had. He might have lost the vision of his right eye without any
exertion, or on any occasion, even in his sleep."
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the injury would not have been compensable. Where the Court has
declined to make a determination whether or not the employee's
injury was employment-caused, 23 the decision has been overruled
only in its utilization of the ordinary exertion rules. In cases where
it is not clear whether the Court was relying upon the ordinary
exertion rules or upon a failure of the claimant to prove employ-
ment-cause, it is appropriate to assume only that the portion of the
decision stating the ordinary exertion rules has been overruled.
Similarly, where the decision rests both upon the ordinary exertion
rules and another legal requirement 2 4 only that portion applying
the ordinary exertion rules has been affected.
V.
"HAPPENING SUDDENLY AND VIOLENTLY"
WHAT MUST HAPPEN SUDDENLY AND VIOLENTLY?
The statute now defines "accident" as "an unexpected or unfore-
seen injury happening suddenly and violently." On its face, this
language may seem ambiguous in that it can be taken literally to
mean:
a. the employment-cause of injury must take place suddenly
and violently;
b. the injury must manifest itself suddenly and violently;
c. either the employment-cause or injury-manifestation must
happen suddenly and violently;
d. both the employment-cause and injury-manifestation must
happen suddenly and violently, but there can be a time interval
between the employment-cause and injury-manifestation;
e. all of the operative facts from employment-cause through
injury-manifestation must happen suddenly and violently.
23 E.g., Hladky v. Omaha Body & Equip. Co., 172 Neb. 197, 203, 109 N.W.2d
111, 114-15 (1961): "We do not think it is necessary for this court to
decide which theory was correct. Whichever was true his condition was
not caused by an accident within the meaning of the Workmen's Com-
pensation Act. Neither was it caused by exertion which was greater
than that ordinarily incident to the employment. Even if such ordinary
exertion combined with a pre-existing disease produced disability, it
is not under that act compensable."
24 E.g., Murray v. National Gypsum Co., 160 Neb. 463, 70 N.W.2d 394 (1955)
("happening suddenly and violently and producing at the time objective
symptoms of an injury"); Hamilton v. Huebner, 146 Neb. 320, 19 N.W.2d
552 (1945) (evidence rules concerning res gestae).
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A closer examination of the whole statutory framework should
show clearly, however, that, as before the 1963 amendment, the
requirement of suddenness means only that the employment-cause
of injury must take place suddenly and violently. Where an em-
ployee sustains the factual burden of proving an employment-
caused injury from a single exertion or strain, the injury will
have happened suddenly and violently even if it manifested itself
gradually over an extended period of time. On the other hand, an
injury which may be shown factually to have been caused by the
employment gradually over an extended period of time will not
be compensable even if it dramatically manifests itself instan-
taneously.
In this sense, "happening suddenly and violently" is being in-
terpreted to mean "caused by the employment suddenly and vio-
lently." This seems wholly consistent with the section providing
for the payment of compensation, to which the accident definition
relates. That section states that "compensation shall be paid in
every case of injury or death caused by accident or occupational
disease arising out of and in the course of employment .... ,25
As a matter of underlying policy, the requirement of suddenly
and violently serves to establish a definite time and place to which
the injury is traceable. Locating the time and place within the
employment carries out the purpose of placing the blood of the
workman on the economic consumers of the products or services
whose creation caused the injury. It also gives the employer
a more adequate opportunity to defend against a specific factual
allegation.
The overwhelming legislative purpose behind the 1963 amend-
ment was to eliminate the arbitrary factual situations arising under
the slip, trip or fall rules which preclude recovery for work injuries
caused by ordinary exertion or strain. The main contention in this
regard was that it made no sense to deny injured workmen medical
or disability benefits merely because the form of the cause of his
injury did not involve a slip, trip, fall, or other external event. The
injured workman who can prove factually that his employment
caused him injury should be entitled to compensation regardless of
whether the injury involved an internal body failure or external
cause.
Similarly, it makes no sense to predicate compensation upon
whether the type of injury received by the employee is one which
manifests itself slowly or suddenly. The injured workman who sus-
25 NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-109 (Reissue 1960).
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tains an injury which takes an extended period of time to manifest
itself should be compensated along with the employee whose
injury develops immediately.
While the same argument might be advanced with respect to
injuries caused gradually as to injuries manifested gradually, there
are strong policy and statutory grounds for distinguishing between
them. These relate mainly to matters of fixing the time and place
of the cause within the employment and giving an employer a
;neaningful opportunity to defend.
The statute also contains the language "producing at the time
objective symptoms of an injury." If "happening" relates to injury-
manifestation, then the "producing" phrase is rendered meaningless.
In any case of injury, there would by definition be "objective symp-
toms" of an injury. The opposite is not true, however. There can be
objective symptoms of an injury without an actual injury at that
time.26 The requirement of "objective symptoms at the time" tends
to give notice to the injured employee, employer and potential
witnesses that there may be a compensable injury, and thus bolsters
the fundamental purpose of the accident requirement.
It is apparent that the 1963 Legislature felt that the statutory
requirement of suddenness is significant. L.B. 498, which would
have deleted the requirement was unanimously killed by the
Judiciary Committee to which both bills were referred, and L.B. 497
ultimately reported out without deletion of this language.
The Nebraska decisions during the period when "unexpected
or unforeseen event" meant either an internal body failure or an
external event do not resolve this ambiguity, which also existed
then. Manning v. Pomerene27 stated broadly, "The unforeseen
event was the straining, weakening or lesion of the blood vessels of
the brain or stomach, and this was an unforseen [sic] event happen-
ing suddenly." The paralytic stroke from which the employee
claimed compensation was not brought about until more than two
weeks later. But the snow blindness case, Hayes v. McMullen,28 con-
tains an equally strong inference that it is injury-manifestation
which must happen suddenly, stating, "[A] case of 'snow blindness'
which is a condition that requires several hours to manifest itself...
26 The latent injury cases are the best example of situations where there
must be objective symptoms of an injury at the time of employment-
cause but no injury manifests itself for a long period of time.
27 101 Neb. 127, 129, 162 N.W. 492, 493 (1917).
28 128 Neb. 432, 259 N.W. 165 (1935).
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and which, as in this case, did manifest itself by visible irritations
during the day of exposure, is an accident, unexpected, unforeseen,
happening suddenly and violently...." The decisions from other
states having comparable statutory language are equally inconclu-
sive.
How RAPIDLY IS "SUDDENLY AND VIOLENTLY?"
The phrase "suddenly and violently" seems to have been applied
as an entity relating. to speed, without imposing an additional re-
quirement of physical violence. At least, no reported decision in
which the injury has happened "suddenly" has determined that the
injury did not happen "violently." For example, a mental break-
down by an elevator operator trapped for thirty minutes with a
dying man who was being crushed to death between floors was said
to have happened "violently" within the meaning of the accident
definition, even though it did not involve "violence to the physical
structure of the body" under the definition of "injury."29
There are few Nebraska decisions pertaining to the time period
which the Court might consider to be sudden. This requirement has
been in the statute since its enactment in 1913. Similar language
appears in the statutes of Alabama, Florida, Idaho, Louisiana, Mis-
souri, Nevada and Washington.3 0 There is no indication that any of
these other states have achieved a more definite concept of sudden-
29 Bekeleski v. 0. F. Neal Co., 141 Neb. 657, 4 N.W.2d 741 (1942).
3 0 ALA. CODE tit. 26, § 262(i) (1958) ("unexpected or unforeseen event,
happening suddenly and violently, with or without human fault, and
producing at the time injury to the physical structure of the body by
accidental means"); FLA. STAT. § 440.02(19) (1961) ("unexpected or
unusual event or result, happening suddenly"); IDAno CODE Amy. § 72-201
(1949) ("unexpected, undesigned, and untoward event, happening
suddenly and connected with the industry in which it occurs, and which
can be definitely located as to time when and place where it occurred,
causing an injury"); LA. REv. STAT. § 23:1021(1) (1950) ("unexpected or
unforeseen event happening suddenly or violently, with or without
human fault and producing at the time objective symptoms of an
injury"); Mo. AN. STAT. § 287.020(2) (Supp. 1962) ("unexpected or
unforeseen event happening suddenly and violently, with or without
human fault and producing at the time objective symptoms of an
injury"); NEv. REV. STAT. § 616.020 (1961) ("unexpected or unforeseen
event happening suddenly and violently, with or without human fault,
and producing at the time objective symptoms of an injury"); WAsH.
REv. CODE § 51.08.100 (1962) ("sudden and tangible happening, of a
traumatic nature, producing an immediate or prompt result, and oc-
curring from without"). The requirement of suddenness in an accident
definition is believed to have originated in the Minnesota act of 1913.
Minn. Laws c. 467, § 34(h), p. 693'(1913) ("unexpected or unforeseen
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ness, or that factual determinations would be any more clear, than
under the Nebraska cases discussed below. Certainly, the decisions
in the other states have not attempted to provide either a black
letter rule or a formula for making a determination whether an
injury happened suddenly. The Nebraska decisions, although ex-
tremely few in number, may serve as a basis as to how the Nebraska
Court might at least approach some categories of factual issues.
(a) The straw that breaks the worker's back
A worker who, out of and in the course of his employment, lifts
the straw which factually causes him a direct injury has been, and
will continue to be, entitled to compensation based upon his total
resulting physical condition. The change made by the 1963 legis-
lation means that now the ordinary exertion of lifting the straw
can be the basis of a compensable accident. The injury will no
longer need to have been caused by an external event or a slip,
trip or fall. There was no substantive change in the previous Ne-
braska rules concerning aggravation of a pre-existing infirmity.31
An employee is entitled to compensation for aggravation of a
pre-existing infirmity whether the pre-existing condition was con-
genital, unrelated to any employment, related to previous employ-
ment, or related to the employment in which the aggravation
occurred.32 Lifting the straw need not be the sort of activity which
would have produced disability by itself were it not for the presence
of the pre-existing infirmity. Full benefits are payable although
the resulting disability is more severe than it would have been in
the absence of the pre-existing impairment.
The statute now codifies the former rule that the resulting state
of disability cannot be a natural progression of the pre-existing
condition.3 3 This codification illustrates quite clearly the legislative
event, happening suddenly and violently, with or without human fault
and producing at the time, injury to the physical structure of the body").
The accident requirement was entirely deleted from Minnesota law
in 1953.
31 One phase of the aggravation rules was codified. See note 33 infra.
32See Gradwohl, Nebraska Workmen's Compensation for Aggravation
of Pre-Existing Infirmities By Exertion or Strain, 41 NEB. L. REV. 101,
102-04 (1961).
33 NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-151(4), as amended by L.B. 497 73d Neb. Leg. Sess.
(1963): "The terms [injury and personal injury] shall not be construed
to include disability or death due to natural causes but occurring while
the employee is at work, nor to mean an injury, disability or death that
is the result of a natural progression of any preexisting condition."
The Supreme Court of Nebraska previously stated: 'When an
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intention that the judicial rules concerning aggravation of a pre-
existing infirmity would remain unchanged, since, without the
judicial aggravation rules allowing compensation, the exception
to the aggravation rules which was codified would be meaningless
and unnecessary.
It will be extremely difficult factually to distinguish the straw
which breaks the worker's back cases from those involving gradual
deterioration. This will depend upon whether the claimant can
demonstrate factually that something finally gave way. The de-
termination will have to be made on a case by case basis whether the
injury was the culmination of continuous erosion to the very end,
or whether the claimant has established that his body, however far
it may previously have been eroded, finally gave way suddenly.
For example, an Alabama worker was allowed compensation
for a herniated disc from lifting bundles of fabric from a waist
high bin, a task she had been performing for nearly twenty three
years. 34 She testified she had a "catch in her back" which felt as
if needles had been stuck in it, and became nauseated and weak.
But where the head of a femur in a janitor's leg deteriorated over
a twenty three month period, recovery was denied because the
evidence did not show a sudden happening at a specific time.8 5
Similarly, in Florida, a woman fruit packer of eight weeks was
able to convince the court that her back "finally gave way,"36 but
other workers have not been able to prove sudden back injuries,
especially where there was a previous history of back pain.37
(b) Separately-sudden, substantial happenings (external or inter-
nal) which combine to produce disability
In Van Vleet v. Public Service Co.,38 the Court allowed recovery
where it concluded that a death on March 18th was due to encepha-
employee meets with an accident which accelerates or aggravates an
existing impairment to a state of disability, such disability not being
the result of a natural progression of the impairment, there may be an
award of compensation therefor." Crable v. Great Western Sugar Co.,
166 Neb. 795, 90 N.W.2d 805 (1958); Turner v. Beatrice Foods Co., 165
Neb. 338, 85 N.W.2d 721 (1957); McCoy v. Gooch Milling & Elevator Co.,
156 Neb. 95, 54 N.W.2d 373 (1952).
34 Alabama Textile Prods. Corp. v. Grantham, 263 Ala. 179, 82 So. 2d
204 (1955). See Davis Lumber Co. v. Self, 263 Ala. 276, 82 So. 2d 291
(1955).
35 United Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Culiver, 271 Ala. 568, 126 So. 2d 119 (1961).
36 Spivey v. Battaglia Fruit Co., 138 So. 2d 308 (Fla. 1962).
37 E.g., Martin Co. v. Carpenter, 132 So. 2d 400 (Fla. 1961).
38111 Neb. 51, 195 N.W. 467 (1923).
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litis caused by gassings in two separate accidents occurring the
preceding November 1st and February 1st. On each of these occa-
sions, there had been objective symptoms of an injury, although no
injury.
As a theoretical proposition, the same result might be reached
where -the employee sustains ten, twenty, a hundred, or even
thousands of such incidents over a much longer period of time. But
as a practical matter, the aggravation of pre-existing infirmity rules
might make any but the last occurrence irrelevant in virtually all
cases. And, as the cases in the next subsection indicate, at some
point, the Nebraska Court will not treat each minor impact as a
separate accident.
A workable prediction of how this conflict can and should be
resolved under the Nebraska statute, cases, and legislative intent
is as follows: Where separately-sudden, substantial happenings
(external or internal) arising out of and in the course of the em-
ployment combine factually to produce disability, the injury is
compensable regardless of the time interval between the happen-
ings. In determining whether a happening is substantial, all of the
requirements of the accident definition other than manifestation of
injury must be met. Of special and critical importance is that there
be objective symptoms of injury at the time of each happening. As
many of the happenings as individually meet all of the require-
ments of the accident definition other than injury-manifestation
can be grouped together. If this combination of separate happen-
ings would have produced disability either outright or under the
aggravation of pre-existing infirmity rules, the injury is com-
pensable.
(c) Gradual physical deterioration or disintegration (whether or
not caused by a series of minor impacts)
In some cases, an employee may sustain an injury where there
is no specific happening or happenings to which the injury can be
traced. During a period of time involving the performance of
employment duties, the employee's health may deteriorate or dis-
integrate to a point of disability.
If the employee can prove factually that his employment caused
the deterioration, he will additionally be required to show that
this happened suddenly. The legislative intent to eliminate the
means of injury as a criterion for compensation should imply that
as a legal rule, the suddenness requirement should be given the
same interpretation whether the injury is caused by a gradual
body failure or a series of minor physical impacts. The factual
proof of employment connection may be easier where identifiable
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
impacts or external events are present. At least, this sort of proof
showing a specific time and place within the employment where
the injury was allegedly caused should have a greater persuasive
effect. A determination of the maximum time period which can
constitute "suddenly" under the statute should not, however, be
dependent upon the method by which the injury was caused.
Before enactment of the occupational disease statute, 9 the
Court denied recovery for silicosis even though it noted that the
injury may have been employment-caused "'drop by drop,' little
by little, day after day, for weeks and months."40 The opinion cited
with apparent disapproval a federal decision under Idaho law
(which did not then contain the statutory requirement of sudden-
ness) allowing compensation to a painter who became disabled
from breathing poisonous gas fumes for a. period of one week.41
39 The Nebraska occupational disease statute was enacted in 1943. Although
there is no requirement of suddenness with respect to occupational
diseases, the Nebraska coverage is limited by the definition that occupa-
tional disease "shall mean only a disease which is due to causes and
conditions which are characteristic of and peculiar to a particular trade,
occupation, process or employment and shall exclude all ordinary
diseases of life to which the general public are exposed." NEB. REv. STAT.
§ 48-151(3) (Reissue 1960).
40 Svoboda v. Mandler, 133 Neb. 433, 439-40, 275 N.W. 599, 602 (1937).
41 Id. at 440, 275 N.W. at 602, citing Sullivan Mining Co. v. Aschenbach,
33 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1929). At the time of the Nebraska decision, the Idaho
statute did not yet contain a definition of the term "accident" and a
statutory requirement of suddenness. IDAHO CODE A~x. § 43-1001 (1932).
As a result the Idaho court had granted recovery for silicosis contracted
over a four and one-half year period where employer's preventative
measures could have avoided the injury (and the disease therefore was
not an occupational disease for which compensation was not then
payable). Brown v. St. Joseph Lead Co., 60 Idaho 49, 87 P.2d 1000 (1939).
Where an employee-driver had to press a gear shift lever of his truck
with his knee to keep work gears meshed, and this caused a slipping of
the gear which bruised his knee over a one month period causing
disability, the Court also had allowed compensation. Aldrich v. Dole,
43 Idaho 30, 249 Pac. 87 (1926). In 1939, the statutory requirement of
suddenness was added in the definition of "accident" as a part of an
occupational disease law. Idaho Laws c. 161, § 1, p. 287 (1939). After
enactment of this statute, the Court denied -compensation to an employee
for a knee injury from pressure.exerted while working on his knees for a
period of two days. With the Justices splitting three to two on the
issue, the earlier cases were distinguished on the basis of the "active
agent present, external to the claimant himself." Carlson v. Batts, 69
Idaho 456, 207 P.2d 1023 (1949). "
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In Blair v. Omaha Ice & Cold Storage Co.,42 an employee al-
legedly contracted sciatic rheumatism from being required to work
part-time for about a week indoors cleaning a very warm boiler
and then put to work part-time outside in dripping water and
fifteen to eighteen degrees below zero weather for about a week. The
Court concluded that there was no event which happened suddenly
and violently and which at the time produced objective symptoms
of an injury. And in Murray v. National Gypsum Co.,43 compensa-
tion was denied to a 50-year-old lady rocket packer who claimed
injuries to her shoulder and arm from the cumulative effect of
repeated jars and strains over a six week period.
Hayes v. McMullen,44 after argument of the suddenness issue
in the briefs of counsel, allowed compensation to an operator of a
blade machine for snow blindness caused by exposure for several
hours during a single workday. If the time period of a single work-
42 102 Neb. 16, 165 N.W. 893 (1917). In addition to the requirement of
suddenness, the disease or sickness cases are extremely difficult. The
claimant must relate the illness to the employment as distinguished
from possible nonemployment causes. See, e.g., Lang v. Gage County
Elec. Co., 133 Neb. 388, 275 N.W. 462 (1937). Even where shown to
relate to the employment, courts have split on whether infectious
diseases are compensable accidents. For example, under statutes similar
to Nebraska's, compare Pow v. Southern Constr. Co., 235 Ala. 580, 180
So. 288 (1938) with Costly v. City of Eveleth, 173 Minn. 564, 218 N.W.
126 (1928). See 1 LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 40.30, at
586-89 n.56-57 (1952).
43 160 Neb. 463, 70 N.W.2d 394 (1955). For a similar decision inter-
twining the slip, trip, fall or abnormal strain rules with "happening
suddenly" in a successive impact case, see Tines v. Brown Shoe Co.,
290 S.W.2d 200 (Mo. Ct. App. 1956), apparently overruling Lovell v.
Williams Bros., 50 S.W.2d 710 (Mo. Ct. App. 1932) (allowing compen-
sation for injury caused by three or four days of gouging down on a
spade in trimming bank of a ditch).
44 128 Neb. 432, 436, 259 N.W. 165, 167 (1935): "Was the injury brought
about suddenly? If by 'sudden' is meant instantaneous or practically
so, then it was not suddenly produced. The condition complained of was
the reflection of ultra violet rays of sunlight off of bright snow, which
condition would have to continue for several hours before it would
manifest itself or become known to the person exposed. The condition
of plaintiff manifested itself the same day .... We are therefore of the
opinion that in a case of 'snow blindness,' which is a condition that
requires several hours to manifest itself and is an unusual occurrence in
this climate, and which, as in this case, did manifest itself by visible
irritations during the day of exposure, is an accident, unexpected,
unforeseen, happening suddenly and violently, and producing objective
symptoms of injury to physical structures, within the meaning of the
Workmen's Compensation Law of Nebraska."
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day (which may have extended to twelve hours) is sudden for
purposes of exposure to sunlight, then it would seem to be equally
sudden where there is no active, external agent.
If the Nebraska decisions are read together, we might conclude
that "happening suddenly" means caused by the employment dur-
ing a single workday; or possibly caused by the employment over
a period of time longer than a single workday, but not longer than
a workweek. In this sense, "caused" implies both outright cause and
aggravation of a pre-existing infirmity.45 An answer to fact situa-
tions involving two, three or four workdays will have to await
judicial decision.
VI.
"PRODUCING AT THE TIME OBJECTIVE SYMPTOMS OF AN
INJURY"
L.B. 497 made no change in the statutory requirement that there
be objective symptoms of an injury. In a long line of cases, it has
become settled that symptoms of pain and anguish, such as weak-
ness or expressions of pain clearly involuntary, or any other symp-
toms indicating a deleterious change in body condition, may con-
stitute objective symptoms of an injury.46
As amended, however, the "producing" phrase modifies "injury"
rather than "event." It states that accident means "an unexpected
or unforeseen injury happening suddenly and violently . . . and
producing at the time objective symptoms of an injury."
The requirement "producing at the time" has been in the Ne-
braska compensation law since its enactment in 1913.4 7 Its purpose
is to help achieve the accident requirement's policy to require
45 Theoretically, it should also be possible that so many of these gradual
happenings as meet all of the requirements of the accident definition
other than injury-manifestation can be grouped together with either or
both (a) other gradual happenings meeting all of the requirements of
the accident definition other than injury-manifestation, and (b) sepa-
rately-sudden, substantial happenings meeting all of the requirements
of the accident definition other than injury-manifestation. If any
combination of these happenings would have produced disability either
outright or under the aggravation of pre-existing infirmity rules, the
injury is compensable.
46 See, e.g., Hagler v. Jensen, 173 Neb. 699, 114 N.W.2d 755 (1962); Tilghman
v. Mills, 169 Neb. 665, 100 N.W.2d 739 (1960); Pittenger v. Safeway
Stores, Inc., 166 Neb. 858, 91 N.W.2d 31 (1958); Knudsen v. McNeely,
159 Neb. 227, 66 N.W.2d 412 (1954).
47 Neb. Laws c. 198, § 52(b), p. 601 (1913). . .. ...
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tangible evidence of the time and place of injury within the em-
ployment.
Throughout the existence of the Nebraska compensation law,
regardless of the shift in position of the Court on the slip, trip or
fall rules, the phrase "producing at the time" has meant that the
objective symptoms of an injury must have existed at the time of
employment-cause, rather than injury-manifestation, if there was a
difference in time. The opinion in Manning v. Pomerene48 estab-
lishes that the phrase "objective symptoms of an injury" has a
broader meaning than the term "injury." The objective symptoms
set out by the Court in that opinion related to the employment-
cause of pushing the two steel "I" beams, although compensation
was allowed for a paralytic stroke which did not manifest itself
until about two weeks after the employment-cause.
L.B. 498, the alternative proposal to L.B. 497, would have deleted
the objective symptoms requirement. This seems significant in
demonstrating the legislative intent that "producing at the time"
relates to employment-cause. 49 Unless "producing at the time" per-
tains to employment-cause, there would be no reason for having
the requirement in the statute. At the time an injury manifests
itself, there would automatically seem to be objective symptoms
of an injury, and the entire "producing" phrase would become
meaningless.
The recent decision in Skalak v. County of Seward5° is signifi-
cant both for its apparent holding that the objective symptoms
must be present at the time of employment-cause, and for the
proposition that, if the claimant can show the presence of symptoms
at that time, it is not necessary that the symptoms actually be
48 101 Neb. 127, 129-30, 162 N.W. 492, 493 (1917): "It is also said that no
'objective symptoms' of an injury appeared at the time, and that these
elements are essential. We agree with this argument so far that the
accident must produce 'at the time objective symptoms of an injury,'
but the difficulty is as to what constitutes objective symptoms. De-
fendant's idea is that by objective symptoms are meant symptoms
of an injury which can be seen, or ascertained by touch. We are of
opinion that the expression has a wider meaning, and that symptoms
of pain, and anguish, such as weakness, pallor, faintness, sickness,
nausea, expressions of pain clearly involuntary, or any other symptoms
indicating a deleterious change in the bodily condition may constitute
objective symptoms as required by the statute."
49 On the other hand, the legislature employed the term "injury" from
L.B. 498 in preference to the phrase "event or result" as stated in L.B.
497 as introduced.
50 174 Neb. 659, 119 N.W.2d 43 (1963).
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observed or observable at that time. In other words, the objective-
ness requirement can probably be established at a later time, so
long as the symptoms are objective, and their presence at the time
of employment-cause can be established by evidence.
In most cases, the injured employee or someone else can de-
scribe the existence of objective symptoms some of which will
normally be observable at the time of the employment-cause. It
may be, however, that even at a considerably later date, the objec-
tive symptoms present at the time of employment-cause can be
"inferable or deducible from the evidence of the physicians who
examined and treated him.151
In Skalak, a road maintainer operator had a substantial pre-
existing condition of osteomyelitis which had existed for a number
of years. He was exposed to cold weather, and the jarring and shak-
ing of the maintainer. After a change in his testimony, he finally
testified that he dropped the maintainer blade on his frostbitten
foot, that the foot swelled, and that the fall of the blade produced
no bruise or laceration but it did produce discoloration by the next
day. After noting that this testimony was sufficient to sustain the
plaintiff's burden of proof that he suffered an unexpected and un-
foreseen event happening suddenly and violently, the Court held
that it did not establish the existence of objective symptoms of an
injury at the time. The opinion states, "The plaintiff described no
objective symptom or symptoms. No one else testified to the exis-
tence of objective symptoms at the time, and none were inferable
or deducible from the evidence of the physicians who examined
and treated him."52
This should mean that an employee who sustains an injury
from an employment-cause which does not supply immediate objec-
tive symptoms can demonstrate objective symptoms by subsequent
medical evidence that the symptoms were present at the time of
employment-cause. In some cases, the symptoms may have been
observable but not observed. If the symptoms would have been
pain or something else easily observable to a workman, it may
become necessary factually for the workman to explain away by
evidence his own or others' failure to observe the symptoms. 8 Un-
51 Id. at 668, 119 N.W.2d at 48.
52 Ibid.
53 See, e.g., Klentz v. Transamerican Freightlines, Inc., 173 Neb. 53, 59,
112 N.W.2d 405, 409 (1961): ' We observe that it is just a little unusual
for an employee to fail to mention an injury at the time of its happening,
even to fellow employees. It is even more unusual to take time off
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less a part of the res gestae, statements by the workman to others
at the time may be excludable hearsay.
54
In some cases, objective symptoms may not even be observable
at the time of employment-cause, at least under present medical
knowledge. For example, if an employee drinks employer-furnished
water at a remote construction site which contains an infectious
disease, there may be no objective symptoms for several days.
Assuming factual proof of the place of contraction, and medical
testimony as to the presence of the germs in the body during an
incubation period going back to the time of employment-cause, the
employee should be entitled to compensation under the Nebraska
statute. ,5
The latent injury rules are not exceptions to the objective
symptoms requirement. These rules provide that an employee
will not be denied compensation for his failure to give notice of his
claim within six months or file suit within one year of the accident
when it appears that the injury was latent and the employee did
not have knowledge of it within the statutory period.56 But there
is nothing in the latent injury rule which dispenses with compliance
with all of the accident requirements including that of objective
symptoms at the time of employment-cause. In fact, the repeated
references to "compensable disability" in the latent injury rule
appear to emphasize that except for injury-manifestation, all re-
quirements for the payment of compensation must be met even in
latent injury cases.
VII.
THE BURDEN OF FACTUAL PROOF
L.B. 497 codified the burden of proof rules which have been
firmly established by judicial decision, but have never before ap-
because of an injury and not give that as a reason to the employer until
after returning to work 3 weeks later."
54 See, e.g., Muff v. Brainard, 150 Neb. 650, 35 N.W.2d 597 (1949); Hamilton
v. Huebner, 146 Neb. 320, 19 N.W.2d 552 (1945).
55 The Minnesota Court reached an opposite result under its previous
accident definition. State ex rel. Faribault Woolen Mills Co. v. District
Court, 138 Minn. 210, 164 N.W. 810 (1917).
56 See, e.g., Webb v. Consumers Co-op. Ass'n, 171 Neb. 758, 107 N.W.2d 737
(1961). Changing the term "event" to "injury" in the accident definition
should have no effect upon references in the notice and statute of limita-
tions sections to "accident" or "injury" since the Court has already
applied these provisions to relate to the time at which an employee
acquires knowledge of a compensable disability.
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peared in the compensation law. The sentence, "The claimant
shall have a burden of proof to establish by a preponderance of the
evidence that such unexpected or unforeseen injury was in fact
caused by the employment," is a close paraphrasing of an oft-re-
peated judicial headnote. 57 It seems fair to conclude that this is
also a legislative approval of the incidental aspects of these rules,
such as the requirement that a compensation award cannot be based
on possibilities or speculation, s the rules concerning the weight
given the trial court's observation of witnesses, and the scope of
trial de novo in the Supreme Court.
The sentence, "There shall be no presumption from the
mere occurrence of such unexpected or unforeseen injury that the
injury was in fact caused by the employment," should be taken as a
legislative codification of the Supreme Court holdings which have
refused to engage in such a presumption, either as a matter of law
(to which a liberal construction will be given) or as a matter of
fact (to which a liberal construction will not be given). The recent
57 See, e.g., Pruitt v. McMaken Transp. Co., 175 Neb. 477, 122 N.W.2d 236
(1963); Skalak v. County of Seward, 174 Neb. 659, 119 N.W.2d 43 (1963);
Snowardt v. City of Kimball, 174 Neb. 294, 117 N.W.2d 543 (1962); Smith
v. Stevens, 173 Neb. 723, 114 N.W,2d 724 (1962); Marasco v. Fitzpatrick,
173 Neb. 272, 113 N.W.2d 112 (1962); Dworak v. City of Omaha, 172 Neb.
209, 109 N.W.2d 160 (1961); Hladky v. Omaha Body & Equip. Co., 172
Neb. 197, 109 N.W.2d 111 (1961). See also Wheeler v. Northwestern Metal
Co., 175 Neb. 841 (Nov. 15, 1963).
58 Sometimes the rule has been stated, "An award of compensation in
a workmen's compensation case may not be based upon possibilities,
probabilities, or speculative evidence." Graber v. Scheer, 173 Neb. 552,
114 N.W.2d 13 (1962). If probability means that it is more likely than
not that the injury took place and exists as the claimant contends, then
the use of the term "probabilities" seems inappropriate under the overall
preponderance of evidence requirement. Cf. Marasco v. Fitzpatrick, 173
Neb. 272, 277, 113 N.W.2d 112, 115 (1962): 'The law is well settled that
the burden of proof is on the one asserting death due to other than
natural causes to establish such fact by a preponderance of the evi-
dence.... This does not mean, in a workmen's compensation case, that
accidental death must be established to a certainty. The requirement
is that it be established to a reasonable certainty. . . . 'In order that
plaintiff recover under the workmen's compensation law for accidental
death of an employee, the burden of proof is upon her to show with
reasonable certainty that the death was proximately caused by the
alleged injury.' Reasonable certainty is not so fixed a criterion that
facts and circumstances in other decisions will be particularly helpful
in any given case. There is, it is true, a twilight zone where reasonable
certainty may be indistinguishable from reasonable probability, but
we can say definitely that mere probability or possibility can never
bridge that gap."
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decisions in Cochran v. Bellevue Bridge Comm'n59 and Marasco v.
Fitzpatrick6 are illustrative of the type of decision codified by this
sentence. The statutory language has much more significance in
death cases, especially unwitnessed death cases, than in nonfatal
injury situations.
Both of the sentences added to the accident definition employ
the phrase "in fact caused by the employment." There was no
apparent legislative interpretation to broaden or restrict the general
employment relationship "arising out of and in the course of em-
ployment." The sentence merely codifies the factual burden of
proof requirement, which has always rested upon the compensation
claimant, to establish that the injury or death did arise out of and
in the course of his employment.
The phrase "in fact caused by the employment" will most nearly
approximate the Court's interpretation of "out of employment."
Under all of the circumstances, there must be a reasonable causal
connection between the conditions under which the work is required
to be performed and the injury received.61 Stated differently, the
occurrence of injury or death at the time and place sustained by
the employee must be traceable to some employment circumstances
(which, additionally, must have happened suddenly and violently
and produced at the time objective symptoms of an injury), or have
flowed from some employment circumstances so soon thereafter as
not to be attributable to another cause.
These categorical statements are admittedly over generalized
and ambiguous. Fortunately, most cases will not push the defini-
tions to their extremes. Where extreme fact applications are pre-
sented, the determinations will be difficult. But the courts have
decided equally difficult cases in many areas of the law, including
the workmen's compensation law. For example, it has not been
easy to decide whether a heart attack caused the employee to fall
or whether the fall caused a heart attack.62 As a matter of social
59 174 Neb. 761, 119 N.W.2d 292 (1963) (bridge tolltaker died from heart
attack while delivering money to bank).
60 173 Neb. 272, 113 N.W.2d 112 (1962) (electrician died either by electro-
cution or from heart attack).
61 Graber v. Scheer, 173 Neb. 552, 114 N.W.2d 13 (1962); Cochran v. Belle-
vue Bridge Comm'n, 174 Neb. 761, 769-70, 119 N.W.2d 292, 297-98 (1963).
62 See, e.g., Cochran v. Bellevue Bridge Comm'n, 174 Neb. 761, 119 N.W.2d
292 (1963); Ruderman v. Forman Bros., 157 Neb. 605, 60 N.W.2d 658
(1953); Mook v. City of Lincoln, 143 Neb. 254, 9 N.W.2d 184 (1943); Schir-
mer v. Cedar County Farmers Tel. Co., 139 Neb. 182, 296 N.W. 875 (1941).
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policy, the legislature has concluded that compensation should not
be denied to some deserving claimants merely because difficult fact
problems will need to be resolved. These sentences mean, as they
have previously meant by judicial rule, that compensation will be
paid only to the claimant who can sustain a burden of proof by a
preponderance of the evidence relating the injury or death to the
employment.
VIII.
CONCLUSIONS
The only substantive change made in previous Nebraska work-
men's compensation law was to eliminate the judicial interpretation
that an "unexpected or unforeseen event" meant only an "external"
event. The previous rules concerning noncompensability of injuries
sustained from ordinary exertion or strain in performing employ-
ment duties have been legislatively overruled. Other than deletion
of the requirement that a claimant show injury from an external
event such as a slip, trip, fall or unusual exertion, the Nebraska
workmen's compensation law has remained unchanged.
A claimant's burden of factual proof by a preponderance of the
evidence, consistently applied in a multitude of judicial decisions
from enactment of the compensation statute, now appears in the
statute. The absence of a factual presumption of compensability
from the occurrence of injury, also judicially applied on numerous
occasions, has been codified. The denial of compensation, under
rules allowing recovery for aggravation of a pre-existing infirmity,
where the resulting condition is a natural progression of the pre-
existing infirmity has also been codified.
The most significant effect of these changes will be to focus
the primary attention in exertion and strain cases on factual matters
of employment and medical causation rather than the fortuitous
circumstances under which the injury may have been inflicted. The
new cases for which compensation will be allowed under the 1963
amendments are bound to involve extremely difficult fact deter-
minations. But the difficulty of making these factual decisions is
no longer a bar to awarding compensation to those claimants who
can sustain the burden of factual proof. And the situations which
would previously have been compensable under Nebraska law will
not be affected by the 1963 amendments.
From the standpoint of legal interpretation, the Court should
declare affirmatively that the phrase '"happening suddenly and
violently" refers to the employment-cause of injury. While the
statute has been ambiguous from the outset as to what must happen
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"suddenly and violently," the amended language may develop cases
which push this uncertainty to its extremes. Relating "suddenly
and violently" to employment-cause of injury, the phrase "produc-
ing at the time objective symptoms of an injury" will have the
intended and effective meaning of requiring objective symptoms at
the time of employment-cause. These interpretations will also
permit the Court to deal more meaningfully with the time periods
which may be considered "suddenly and violently" in the different
situations where injuries are brought about during a period extend-
ing beyond a single workday.
